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BAR BRIEFS
commerce would be affected by such proposed construction .... "
49 Stat. 846 (1935). Thus once a relationship of the proposed
project to navigation, either foreign or interstate, is found there
is no longer a question as to the right of the Federal Water
Power Commission to control such project very effectively.
THOMAS McCARTY,
Third Year Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In The First National Bank of Waseca, a Corporation, Respt., v. William
L. Paulson, as Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of A. P.
Paulson, deceased, et al., Applts.
That Section 7639 C. L. 1913, which provides that in giving decision the
trial court must state the facts found and the conclusions separately, does
not apply where the final decision is embodied in and evidenced by an order,
and no judgment is required to be entered.
That said Section 7639 C. L. 1913, is applicable only to cases where there
is a trial by the court of an issue of fact, arising upon material averments,
presented by formal pleadings, and where following the findings, a judgment
must be entered.
That said Section 7639 C. L. 1913, does not apply to an order confirming
a mortgage foreclosure sale, entered pursuant to Section 2, Chapter 165, Laws
of 1939.
Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Jansonius, J.
Action by the First National Bank of Waseca against William L. Paulson,
et al., to foreclose a mortgage on real property.
Plaintiff appeals from an order confirming a mortgage foreclosure sale.
AFItIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
In Nome State Bank, a corporation, Respt., v. Melvin
Edna Brendmoen, Applts.

Brendmoen and

That in an action between a mortgagee and mortgagor for the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage an allegation in the complaint to the effect that
the mortgagee surrendered a copy of the mortgage to the mortgagor is not
essential to the statement of a cause of action.
That the failure of a mortgagee to surrender to the mortgagor a copy of
a chattel mortgage at the time of the execution thereof does not render the
mortgage void as between the parties thereto.
Appeal from the District Court of Barnes County, Hon. M. J. Englert, J.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Nanna M. Funk and C. E. Branick, Applts., v. L. R. Baird and T. A.
Tollefson, Respts.
That in an action for specific performance of a contract for sale of real
property, plaintiffs seek relief upon purely equitable grounds; and in order
to be entitled to such relief they must show that they are ready, willing, and
able to fully perform their part of the contract.
That as against the vendees of an executory land contract, the heirs of
the deceased vendor have no right to substitute their personal covenants for
those of the vendor, the vendees having made no contract with the heirs and
not having contracted with the vendor to take conveyance from either her
heirs or assigns.
That where, by the terms of an executory contract for the sale of land,
the vendor agreed "to convey unto the said parties of the second part, or
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their assigns, by deed of warranty and abstract of title" but did not contract
%%ith the vendor to take conveyance from either her heirs or assigns, the
heirs may not, in an action for specific performance of the contract, compel
the vendees to accept deeds of the heirs of the deceased vendor.
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Hon. Harvey J. Miller, J.
AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.

In St. Paul Foundry Company, a corporation, Applt., v. Burnstad School
District No. 31, of Logan County, N. D., a public school corporation, Respt.
That under the facts in this case, where the plaintiff delivered to the
defendant structural steel for the purpose of incorporating the same into a
gymnasium being built by the defendant, and the property was so incorporated and the gymnasium completed so that the structural steel could not be
returned to the plaintiff, any cause of action which the plaintiff had for the
value of such steel accrued at the time the property was delivered and incorporated in the building so built.
That under the provisions of Secttion 7375 of the Compiled Laws, N. D.,
1913, any action brought by the plaintiff to recover the value of such structural steel must be brought within six years from the time the cause of
action accrued in order to be maintained against the defense that the statute
of limitations had run.
Appeal from the District Court of Logan County, Hon. George M.
McKenna, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
In State of North Dakota ex rel Dell Perry, Petr., v. Joe Garecht, as
sheriff of Stark County, Respt.
That where, after conviction for a crime, a defendant appears before the
court for sentence and the court orally pronounces judgment and sentence
upon him, the judgment so pronounced fixes the penalty imposed upon the
defendant and the court may not, in the written judgment subsequently
entered, add the requirement that the defendant serve a jail sentence in
event of nonpayment of a fine, when such jail sentence was not included In
the judgment pronounced.
That where, a defendant is held in custody under a provision in a written
judgment requiring him to serve a jail sentence in event that a fine imposed upon him is not paid, and such provision was not included in the oral
judgment pronounced by the court, the defendant is entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus upon proper application.
Original application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Dell Perry.
Petitioner entitled to Writ. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Joseph P. Durick, Pltf. and Applt., v. Oscar W. Winters, doing business as the Dacotah Cab Company, or 444 Cab, and George Richards, Defts.,
and Oscar W. Winters, doing business as the Dacotah Cab Company, or 444
Cab, Deft. and Respt.
That a motion for a new trial, based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and
its action thereon will not be disturbed unless it is shown there was an abuse
of such discretion..
That an order granting a new trial stands upon firmer ground than one
denying the same, as the outcome results merely in a reinvestigation of the
entire issue on the merits.
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Grand Forks'County granting a new trial, Hon. P. G. Swenson, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
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In Carl S. Brye, Pltf. and Respt., v. William E. Greenfield, et al., and
State of North Dakota, Defts., and State of North Dakota, Applt.
That a complaint in an action to determine adverse claims to real
property, which alleges that the state claims an interest in said property
adverse to the plaintiff, and which fails to allege that the plaintiff filed an
undertaking to pay any costs which may be adjudged against him in favor
of the state, is not vulnerable to a demurrer by the state, alleging that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Dunham Lumber Company v. Gresz, et al., 70 N. D., 295 N. W. 500, followed.
Appeal from the District Court of Benson County, Hon. W. J. Kneeshaw,
Judge. Per Curiam Opinion.
In Mrs. Frances Booke, Pltf. and Respt., v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, Deft. and Applt.
That an injury compensable from the Workmen's Compensation fund
is an "injury by accident" arising in the course of employment, or a "disease
approximately caused by the employment."
That the burden of proof is upon the claimant to show that the death
of a former employee was the result of an injury by accident arising in the
course of his employment, or the result of a disease approximately caused by
the employment.
That where the death of a former employee is shown to be the result of
the chronic heart condition known as angina pectoris, and the death occurred
after the employment had ceased, it is incumbent upon the claimant to prove
that this diseased condition was approximately caused by the employment,
and such burden is not sustained where the proof is purely speculative and
the record is silent as to the origin of the diseased condition.
That where a former employee died from agina pectoris some time after
his employment had ceased, and the record shows that the attack was superinduced by exertion in walking and exposure to extreme cold, it is held:
that claimant has failed to prove that this diseased condition was approximately caused by the former employment or was the result of an injury by
accident occurring in said employment..
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Miller, J.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In Mrs. Florence Moug, Pltf. and Respt., v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, Deft. and Applt.
That Appellate courts determine only questions actually before them on
appeal, and necessary for the decision of the case, and will not give opinions
upon questions of law that are dependent upon a state of facts not established by the evidence.
That the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act provides for compensation only for "an injury arising in the course of employment."
That an injury is received in the course of the employment when it comes
while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform.
That on an appeal from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau disallowing a claim for compensation for injury, the claimant has
the burden of proving that the injury for which compensation is claimed
was received in the course of the employment.
That in the instant case it is held that the evidence fails to show that
the injury for which compensattion is claimed was received in the course of
employment.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Englert, J.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
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In J. H. Goldberg, Applt., v. John Gray, Tax Commissioner, Respt.
That the phrase "income derived from any source whatever" as used in
Section 17, chapter 312, S. L. N. D. 1923, as amended by chapter 253, S. I.
N. D. 1933, refers to the origin of the income, unrestricted by situs or location.
That tax statutes are construed most strictly against the government and
in favor of the citizen.
That the purpose sought to be attained by the construction of any statute
is to arrive at the intention of the lawmaking body that enacted it.
That the term "gross income" as defined in the income tax includes a
resident partner's share of the net profits of a partnership that does business
wholly outside the state of North Dakota.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Jansonius, J.
AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.

In James Glinz and Christ Zurcher, Pltfs. and Respts., v. The State of
North Dakota doing business as The State Hail Insurance Department, et al.,
Defts. and Applts.
That no insurance issued under the provisions of chapter 137, Session
Laws N. D. 1933, takes effect until the application for insurance is actually
received in the office of the Hail Insurance Department.
That where a crop is struck by hail at any time before the application
for the policy is filed with the Hail Insurance Department, no policy issued
under the provisions of the aforesaid act becomes effective.
That a crop is not "struck by hail" within the provisions of said chapter,
unless the hail has caused material damage to the crop. Issendorf v. State,
69 N. D. 56, 283 N. W. 783, followed.
That damage to the crop means substantial damage, some injury by Which
the value is diminished or destroyed, an actual injury not determined by percentage merely, but a damage that is visible, observable, and material.
That evidence is examined and it is held: that before the application for
insurance involved in this case was received by the Hail Insurance Department, the crop sought to be insured had been "struck by hail", and, therefore, there was no liability under the insurance policy.
Appeal from the District Court of Bottineau County, Hon. G. Grimson,
Judge.
REVERSED AND DISMISSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In Eleanor Bentley, Pltf. and Respt., v. Oldetyme Distillers, Inc., a corporation, Deft. and Applt.
That a general agent has authority to do everything necessary or proper
and useful in the ordinary course of business for effecting the purpose of his
agency.
That where an agency is proved by competent evidence, declarations of
the agent made within the scope of his authority may be shown.
That evidence examined and it is held: the record shows that defendant's
agent, acting within the scope of his authority, was conveying plaintiff on the
business of the defendant; that at that time the plaintiff vas injured by the
negligence of the defendant, and without contributory negligence on her
part; and that the damages assessed against the principal were not excessive.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred
Jansonius, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J Nuessle, Morris, JJ.
and Lowe, Dist. J., concur specially. Burke, J., disqualified did not partici.
pate, Lowe Dist. J. sitting.

